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ABSTRACT 
 
The Arctic states established the Arctic Council aiming to 
promote environmental protection and sustainable development 
in the Arctic. However, climate change occurring in the region 
seriously affects both of these objectives. The Council has 
incorporated the climate change issue within its main agenda 
and produces substantial climate change science, and supplies 
valuable information to the policy-makers and general public in 
the region. However, the Council does not seem entirely 
successful in addressing climate change challenges in the 
region. As a soft-law body, the Council cannot create legally 
binding obligations under international law could be seen as a 
disadvantage with respect to its ability on one hand. While soft 
law character helps the Council in avoiding strict formalities 
articulated in international law, also allows the participation of 
non-state actors at policy-making level in resolving regional 
problems along with states, on the other hand. This paper 
suggests a few recommendations for the Arctic Council so that it 
may function better in the field of climate change. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Arctic is the northern most part of the globe that holds 
special geographic features such as ice, snow, permafrost, 
northern lights, sunless days, midnight suns, and so on. The 
inhabitants of the region including various groups of indigenous 
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peoples have found their way of life in the traditional Arctic 
environment. However, increasing climate change has brought 
significant changes in the Arctic environment such as early 
summers, late winters and rapid melting of sea ice and 
permafrost are reported as common phenomena.
1
 These ongoing 
physical and environmental changes have led to new 
opportunities in the region, while also posing significant 
pressures on both its governments and inhabitants.
2
 Moreover, 
climate change in the region not only affects the Arctic residents, 
flora and fauna, but also impacts on the rest of the world.
3
    
The Arctic Council (AC) is the only international 
governance system in the North where all self-described Arctic 
states have membership, created in 1996 via the Ottawa 
Declaration,
4
 which is in fact the general outgrowth of the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) established in 1991 
by the same group.
5
 The AC was formed as a soft-law form of 
governance, to promote environmental protection and 
sustainable development in the Arctic.
6
 However, climate change 
has posed immense threats to both objectives – protection of 
Arctic environment and maintaining sustainable development in 
the Arctic.
7
 Then the AC incorporated the issue of climate 
                                                          
1  See generally CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT – AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 30-31, 
33, 46, 52, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ 
ar4_syr.pdf. [hereinafter AR4 Synthesis Report]; See generally ARCTIC 
MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME (AMAP), ARCTIC CLIMATE ISSUES 
2011: CHANGES IN ARCTIC SNOW, WATER, ICE AND PERMAFROST v, vi, vii, 
3,5,10 (2011), available at http://www.amap.no/documents/doc/arctic-climate-
issues-2011-changes-in-arctic-snow-water-ice-and-permafrost/129. 
2  See generally ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME 
(AMAP), supra note 1, at vii. 
3 Id. at 80-82. SUSAN J. HASSOL, ACIA, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: 
ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 10 (Carolyn Symon ed., 2004) 
[hereinafter ACIA Overview Report]. 
4  See Arctic Council, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic 
Council, (Sept. 19, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 1382, 1388 [hereinafter Ottawa 
Declaration]. 
5 See generally  Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy: Declaration on 
the Protection of Arctic Environment, (Jan. 14, 1991), 30 I.L.M. 1624 
[hereinafter AEPS] (explaining Arctic environmental protection strategy). 
6 See Ottawa Declaration, supra note 4, art. 1(a). 
7 Id. intro. at 1387-88. 
198 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22:1  
change within its agenda after two years of its inception and 
presently the issue dominates the core activities – most of the 
current and forthcoming projects of the AC connect to climate 
change.
8
 Since then, it has been providing policy-makers and the 
general public with valuable information and produces science in 
the field of climate change.   
The AC has become successful (to some extent) primarily 
by creating awareness among local residents about the main 
causes and negative consequences of climate change in the 
region, although it does not seem to have successfully addressed 
all the challenges caused by climate change in the Arctic. 
The U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has recently 
conveyed a message about the future priority of the Arctic 
Council, stating that the USA would continue the efforts of 
Canada when its chair period starts after two years.
9
 According 
to Mr. Kerry, climate change would be the number one agenda 
item since President Barack Obama at least twice emphasized 
the significance of the issue of climate change – once in his 
inaugural address and once in his State of the Union message.
10
 
The top two CO2 emitters, USA and China,
11
 are connected to 
the AC: the former is going to be the next chair and the latter has 
been accredited as an observer state, which may raise a scholarly 
question of how the AC should address its duties to handle the 
issue of climate change from the viewpoint of the Arctic.  
During the year 2013 it is appropriate to evaluate the AC’s 
climate change activity when massive transformations are on the 
way within the governance system, including setting up a 
permanent secretariat.
12
 More importantly, all the Arctic states 
                                                          
8 Timo Koivurova & Md. Waliul Hasanat, The Climate Change Policy of 
the Arctic Council, in CLIMATE GOVERNANCE IN THE ARCTIC 63, 72  (Timo 
Koivurova, Karina Keskitalo & Nigel Bankes eds., 2009). 
9  Kiruna Ministerial Meeting, ARCTIC COUNCIL (May 15, 2013), 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/events/meetings-overview/kiruna-
ministerial-2013. 
10 Id.  
11  For emission rates please see World CO2 Emission by Country, 
TRIPMONDO.COM, https://www.tripmondo.com/magazine/facts-and-statistics/ 
world-co2-emission-by-country/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2013).  
12 The other major developments include introducing regularly budgeting 
system instead of voluntarily funding, appearing in more responsible way by 
creating formal international treaties which create legally binding obligations, 
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have gained experience being the chair of the AC with the 
completion of the first round.
13
  Canada’s withdrawal from the 
Kyoto Protocol while present chair of the AC warrants scholarly 
interest – as to how Canada will lead the AC tackling climate 
change challenges faced by the governments and peoples in the 
North. Any suitable suggestions prepared for the AC may offer 
the newly created permanent secretariat, the chair, and the 
member states ways to efficiently address climate change 
challenges occurring in the region.  
The article comprises six separate parts: following the 
introduction, part two describes the AC briefly in general and 
may provide general readers with an understanding of its 
functioning system and involved entities who may not know 
much about the AC. Part three focuses on the climate change 
related activities of the AC; Part four examines AC’s 
shortcomings, taking into consideration its handling of climate 
change in the North. Part five searches for possible means to 
strengthen the AC’s capability to counter climate change 
challenges. The final part draws the conclusion based on the 
analysis of other parts and prepares a few recommendations in 
this regard.  
 
II. THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 
 
The Arctic states and indigenous peoples established the AC 
as a “high-level intergovernmental forum” for the North. 14 
During the course of time, the AC has developed through distinct 
organisational and operational structures, which generate an idea 
that the AC is very close to an international organisation 
                                                                                                                   
formulating clear rules for involved non-Arctic states and organisations within 
the AC activity etc.  See infra part v(c). 
13  Kiruna Declaration, Arctic Council, May 15, 2013, available at 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-
main-documents-from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting [hereinafter Kiruna 
Declaration]. 
14 History, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/ 
about-us/arctic-council/history (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
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although neither the AEPS nor AC is an international 
organisation from the viewpoint of public international law.
15
  
 
A. Organizational Framework 
 
The organizational framework denotes the basic structure of 
the AC, which is responsible for carrying out its interior 
functions and policymaking. The organizational framework 
comprises three different types of entities: 
 
 Member; 
 Permanent Participant; and 
 Observer16 
 
Member 
 
The eight Arctic
17
 states are members of the Arctic Council. 
According to the Ottawa Declaration, “[m]embers of the Arctic 
Council are: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the 
Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States of America 
(the Arctic States).”18  Thus, seemingly there is no chance to 
accredit any other member in its present situation since there is 
                                                          
15  Since neither the AEPS nor the AC has been created through the 
conclusion of formal international treaties. Timo Koivurova, Limits and 
Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic 
Governance, 46 POLAR REC. 146, 148, 153 (2010); David L. VanderZwaag, et. 
al, The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Arctic Council and 
Multilateral Environmental Initiatives: Tinkering While the Arctic Marine 
Environment Totters, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 154 (2002). 
16  Md. Waliul Hasanat, Towards Model Arctic-Wide Environmental 
Cooperation Combating Climate Change, 20 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL L. 127, 127-28  
(2009). 
17 SWEDEN MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SWEDEN’S STRATEGY FOR THE 
ARCTIC REGION 11 (2011), available at http://www.government.se/content/1/ 
c6/16/78/59/3baa039d.pdf. There is no single definition of the Arctic. 
However, the political definition nowadays is mostly accepted - “the Arctic 
includes all areas north of the Arctic Circle and the associated eight Arctic 
states.” Id.  However, the terms “Arctic”, “Circumpolar North” and “North” are 
used in this article parallel for the same geographic area – the Northern most 
part of the globe. 
18 Ottawa Declaration, supra note 4, art. 2.  
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no Arctic state outside its membership. This may pose a different 
situation for Denmark with respect to its membership at the AC 
in the future when Greenland gets independence as a fully 
sovereign state.  
Ministers for Foreign Affairs from each member state meet 
biennially
19
 at what is known as the Ministerial Meeting. This 
meeting is the highest policy-making body for the AC. The AC 
has also introduced a meeting of deputy ministers between the 
Ministerial Meeting to lessen the gap of communication at a 
political level since 2010.
20
 Both ministers and deputy ministers 
guide the Senior Arctic Officials (SAO), recruited from each 
Arctic state, to implement their political commitments.
21
  
 
Permanent Participant  
 
Permanent Participant (PP) refers to special type of 
membership within the AC that does not have a voting right but 
is entitled to take part in the decision making process, which is a 
comparatively new concept in international cooperation. They 
are entitled to raise a point of order during any discussion on an 
issue which will be decided immediately by the chairperson.
22
 
Consultations with them are required to fix the time and location 
of Ministerial Meetings
23
 and ascertain the size of delegations.
24
 
They are entitled to propose supplementary agenda items
25
 or 
cooperative activities in AC meetings.
26
  
                                                          
19 Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, ¶ 15, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Sept. 17-
18, 1998), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/ 
category/4-founding-documents# (download Arctic Council Rules of 
Procedure) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure]. 
20  FAQ, Ministerial Meetings, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/resources/other-resources/faq (last visited Sept. 26, 
2013). 
21   MD WALIUL HASANAT, SOFT-LAW COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: THE ARCTIC COUNCIL’S EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 192 
(2012). 
22 Rules of Procedure, supra note 19, ¶ 12 
23 Id. ¶ 15. 
24 Id. ¶ 13. 
25 Id. ¶ 19. 
26 Id. ¶ 26. 
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During the course of time, the PPs have developed much 
influence through their position. Their inclusion as PPs is a way 
of recognizing the special importance of Northern indigenous 
peoples.
27
 The idea behind accrediting PPs is to ensure their 
active involvement and full consultation concerning AC 
activities.
28
  
The establishing instrument of the AC specifies the criteria 
for PPs – single group of indigenous people resident in more 
than one arctic states; more than one indigenous people resident 
in single Arctic state.
29
 
The AC has granted PP status to six indigenous 
communities in the Arctic: 
 
 The Inuit Circumpolar Council 
 The Saami Council 
 The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples  of 
the North 
 The Aleut International Association 
 The Arctic Athabaskan Council and 
 The Gwich’in Council International.30 
 
Observers 
 
The AC has granted observer status to a number of non-
Arctic states,
 
global and regional inter parliamentary 
organizations, along with non-governmental organizations who 
may actively take part in its activities.
31
 Their main functions 
include observing the activities of the AC, although they are 
                                                          
27 Terms of Reference for a Sustainable Development Programme para. 2, 
ARCTIC COUNCIL (Sept. 17-18, 1997), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/ 
en/document-archive/category/4-founding-documents# (download Terms of 
Reference for a Sustainable Development Programme) [hereinafter Terms of 
Reference]. 
28 Ottawa Declaration, supra note 4, art. 2.  
29 Id. 
30 Permanent Participants, ARCTIC COUNCIL http://www.arctic-council. 
org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
31  Ottawa Declaration, supra note 4, art. 3. 
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encouraged to contribute to these activities at the level of 
working groups.
32
 
Presently 12 states have observer status within the AC: 
France, Germany, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, China, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea and 
Singapore.
33
 Nine
34
 intergovernmental organizations and eleven
35
 
non-governmental organizations have observer status within the 
AC.
36
 The EU presently acts as an ad hoc observer until further 
decision is made on a pending application of EU Commission,  
requesting for the observer status to the AC.
37
 There is a growing 
number of states showing interest in AC activities, which 
encouraged SAOs to adopt an observer manual
38
 that articulates 
the role of observers among other things.
39
 
 
                                                          
32 Arctic Council [AC], Arctic Council Observer Manual for Subsidiary 
Bodies, ¶ 6, available at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-
archive/category/425-main-documents-from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2013).   
33 Observers, ARCTIC COUNCIL http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/ 
en/about-us/arctic-council/observers (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
34  International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies, 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature, Nordic Council of 
Ministers, Nordic Environment Finance Corporation, North Atlantic Marine 
Mammal Commission, Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the 
Arctic Region, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United 
Nations Development Program and United Nations Environment Program. 
Artic Council, Observers, (April 27, 2011), http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers. 
35 Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas, Arctic Circumpolar 
Gateway, Association of World Reindeer Herders, Circumpolar Conservation 
Union, International Arctic Science Committee, International Arctic Social 
Sciences Association, International Union for Circumpolar Health, 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Northern Forum, University 
of the Arctic and World Wide Fund for Nature-Global Arctic Program. Artic 
Council, Observers, (April 27, 2011), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/ 
en/about-us/arctic-council/observers. 
36 Observers, supra note 33.  
37 See Webcast of Kiruna Ministerial Meeting, supra note 9.   
38 See Arctic Council Observer Manual For Subsidiary Bodies, supra note 
32. 
39  Kiruna Declaration, supra note 13, at 6 (the part: Strengthening the 
Arctic Council). 
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    B. Operational Framework  
 
Operational framework means, for the purposes of this 
article, the structure through which the AC performs various 
activities. The operational framework mainly includes: 
 
 Senior Arctic Officials 
 Working Groups, and 
 The Secretariat40 
 
Senior Arctic Officials  
 
Each Arctic state designates a senior level government 
servant responsible to arctic affairs for their government.
41
 
However, SAO meetings include a senior official from each of 
the Arctic states and PPs’ representatives. 42  The SAO 
coordinates, monitors, and guides the subordinate bodies (e.g., 
working groups and task forces) formed under the AC,
43
 and 
receives reports from them.
44
 The SAO reports to the AC 
regularly on the basis of those subordinate bodies’ reports, 
reviews proposals concerning cooperative activities submitted by 
the member states or PP, and prepares recommendations on 
those proposals for the AC Ministerial Meetings.
45
 The Arctic 
Ministers instruct the SAO to provide means for addressing 
individual issues connected with the AC.
46
 The SAO requires 
convening at least two meetings a year,
47
 but the frequency of 
the meetings mainly depends on the willingness of the chair 
states. 
 
Working Groups 
 
                                                          
40  Hasanat, supra note 16, at 130. 
41  Rules of Procedure, supra note 19, pt. II ¶ 21. 
42 Id. 
43 See id. pt. IV. 
44 Id. pt. II ¶ 23. 
45 Id. pt. II ¶ 24. 
46 Hasanat, supra note 16, at 130. 
47 Rules of Procedure, supra note 19, pt. II ¶ 25. 
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The AC forms Working Groups (WG), Task Forces (TF), 
and other subsidiary bodies to prepare programs and carry out 
different activities under the guidance of the SAO.
48
 The idea of 
forming WGs is to create expert groups within the AC in specific 
areas and allocate distinct types of work to each of them. The 
WGs are comprised of representatives drawn mainly from the 
national ministries, including other government bodies of 
member states and from the PPs.
49
 The AC Ministerial Meetings 
fix the mandate and composition of the WGs.
50
 Each WG selects 
its chairperson and vice-chairperson, fixing their tenure subject 
to consultation with the SAO.
51
 The secretariats of the WGs are 
supported voluntarily by individual member states.
52
 The date, 
venue and agenda of the meetings of WGs are set by the 
consensus of the participating Arctic states.
53
 Each WG may 
establish its own operating guidelines on the basis of SAOs 
instruction.
54
 Currently the AC operates its activities through six 
WGs: The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), 
Protection of Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), Emergency 
Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), Conservation of 
Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), The Sustainable Development 
Working Group (SDWG), and The Arctic Contaminants Action 
Program (ACAP).
55
 All of the WGs contribute to the activity of 
the AC, although the efforts of AMAP and SDWG are much 
higher compared to other WGs. However, the AC has not yet 
determined the working boundaries of the WGs, which has 
                                                          
48 Id. pt. IV ¶ 28. 
49 HASANAT, supra note 21, at 193. 
50 REVISED ARCTIC COUNCIL  R.  P.  28, available at http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-main-documents-
from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting. 
51 Id. pt. IV ¶ 29. 
52  The AMAP secretariat is located in Oslo, Norway. The PAME 
secretariat is located together with the CAFF secretariat in Akureyri, Iceland. 
The EPPR and ACAP secretariats are situated in Moscow, Russia, and the 
SDWG secretariat is located in Ottawa, Canada. 
53 Rules of Procedure, supra note 19, pt. IV ¶ 30. 
54 Id. pt. IV ¶ 31. 
55
 Artic Council, Working Groups, (April 11, 2013), http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups. 
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created ambiguity for many projects seeking implementation 
through the appropriate WG.
56
 
In addition to the above mentioned WGs, the AC has set 
several Task Forces (TF)/Action Plans from time to time, such as 
the Task Force for Institutional Issues (TFII),
57
 and Task Force 
on Search and Rescue.
58
 The TFs work on specific issues or for a 
limited amount of time. A TF is comprised of expert groups from 
WGs and representatives from member states.
59
 A TF may come 
to an end when it has produced the desired result; alternatively, a 
TF/AP may be shifted to WG when the AC finds its work to be 
important – the Arctic Council’s Action Plan to Eliminate 
Pollution in the Arctic (ACAP) was endorsed at the 2000 Barrow 
Ministerial Meeting,
60
 aiming to focus mainly on pollution 
prevention and remediation, which was transformed into a WG 
in 2006 renamed as the Arctic Contaminants Action Program 
(ACAP).  
 
The Secretariat 
 
The AC waited a long time to  create the Arctic Council 
Secretariat (ACS). – earlier the responsibility of providing 
secretarial support was imposed on the chair state, which is 
presently performed following rules as set out in the Terms of 
Reference for the secretariat.
61
 In 2006, the AC got a semi-
permanent secretariat when three Nordic states (Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden) agreed to share a common secretariat 
located in Tromsø (Norway) during their chairmanships (2006 to 
                                                          
56 HASANAT, supra note 21, at 193. 
57 Arctic Council, Task Force for Institutional Issues, (Dec. 29, 2011), 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/password-for-tfii. 
58 Arctic Council, Task Force on Search and Rescue, (Dec. 29, 2011), 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/task-
forces/282-task-force-on-search-and-rescue. 
59
 Arctic Council, Task Forces of the Arctic Council, (Dec. 29, 2011), 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/task-
forces/279-task-forces-of-the-arctic-council. 
60 Barrow Declaration, Arctic Council, art. 2, Oct. 13, 2000. 
61 REVISED ARCTIC COUNCIL  R.  P.  32, available at http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-main-documents-
from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting. 
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2012).
62
 Subsequently, the idea for the establishment of a 
permanent secretariat was endorsed by the Nuuk Ministerial 
Meeting in 2011 and it was decided to establish a task force to 
implement the decisions to strengthen the AC, including any 
necessary practical arrangements to establish the secretariat;
63
 
the SAO adopted the Terms of Reference of the Arctic Council 
Secretariat
64
 in 2012, and finally the Tromsø secretariat became 
the permanent secretariat of the AC in 2013. 
 
III. CLIMATE CHANGE WORKS OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 
 
The AEPS, the forerunner of the AC, acknowledged climate 
change as a major threat to the Arctic environment
65
 and 
articulated a principle showing “respect the Arctic’s significance 
for and influence on the global climate”66 other than including it 
in its working agenda. However, the AC has incorporated the 
climate change issue under its mandate within two years of its 
inception and at the present the issue of climate change plays a 
dominant role in the AC.
67
 Being a soft-law form of governance, 
the AC can do little to mitigate global climate change, which 
requires a cut in CO2 emission from all parts of the world. 
However, contributions for adaptation to climate change and its 
consequences require actions within the region. The climate 
change work of the AC includes the establishment of the Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), ACIA Policy Document, 
the Arctic Council Focal Point, Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost 
in the Arctic (SWIPA), the Arctic Council Task Force on Short-
lived Climate Forcers, climate change related reports/project, 
and the AC’s involvement in the global climate change regime.68 
 
                                                          
62 Norwegian, Danish, Swedish common objective for their arctic council 
chairmanships, common objectives and priorities for the Norwegian, Danish 
and Swedish chairmanships of the arctic council (2006-2012). 
63 Nuuk Declaration, Arctic Council , at 2, May 12, 2011. 
64 Terms of Reference of the Arctic Council Secretariat, Arctic Council, ¶ 
2, DMM02-15 (May 15, 2012). 
65 AEPS, supra note 5, § 6, at 30. 
66Id., § 2.2(iii)(c), at 10. 
67 See Hasanat, supra note 16, at 139 139. 
68 HASANAT, supra note 21, at 117. 
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A. Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
 
The AC (AMAP and CAFF) and the International Arctic 
Science Committee
69
 jointly established the ACIA in 2000 and 
intended to gather knowledge on climate change and ultra-
violate radiation in the Arctic.
70
 ACIA produced an overview 
report
71
 in 2004, mainly prepared for the policy-makers and 
general public, and produced a scientific report
72
 in 2005 made 
for people with technical knowledge.
73
  
The ACIA overview report presented significant changes 
caused from climate change in the Arctic including ten key 
findings:
74
 
 
1. The Arctic climate is now warming rapidly, and 
much larger changes are projected; 
2. Arctic warming and its consequences have 
worldwide implications; 
3. Arctic vegetation zones are very likely to shift, 
causing wide-ranging impacts;  
4. The diversity of animal species, their ranges and 
distribution will change;  
5. Many coastal communities and facilities face 
increasing exposure to storms;  
6. Reduced sea ice is very likely to increase marine 
transport and access to resources; 
7. Thawing ground will disrupt transportation, 
buildings, and other infrastructures; 
8. Indigenous communities face major economic and 
cultural impacts; 
9. Elevated ultraviolet radiation levels will affect 
people, plants, and animals; 
10. Multiple influences will interact to cause increased 
impacts on people and ecosystems. 
                                                          
69 About ISAC, INT’L ARCTIC SCI. COMM., http://www.iasc.info/home/iasc 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2013). 
70 ACIA, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, 6(2005) [hereinafter ACIA 
Scientific Report]. 
71  ACIA Overview Report, supra note 3. 
72  ACIA Scientific Report, supra note 70. 
73 Both reports were prepared based on the same data and obtained from a 
combination of modern research and traditional indigenous knowledge. 
74 ACIA Overview Report, supra note 3, at 10-11. 
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The report has also presented a number of alarming 
phenomena relevant to the Arctic.
75
 One of the important 
elements of the ACIA report is the projection of climate change 
impacts on human beings (in particular the indigenous peoples of 
the Arctic) from various perspectives.
76
 Climate change may 
threaten the cultural survival of Arctic indigenous peoples, 
whose ways of life are based on herding, hunting, and fishing.
77
 
The detrimental consequences of climate change may deprive 
these peoples of their traditional food and they may have to 
adapt to new species, which may move to the North.
78
 The 
change in the Arctic would also cause more challenging 
conditions for them to hunt marine mammals on thin ice, since 
open water is less predictable than water that is covered by ice.
79
 
In regard to health, new insect and animal vectors may cause 
new diseases and increasing levels of skin cancer, cataracts, and 
viral infections are already evident in the region.
80
 The effect of 
climate change on the petroleum and fishery industries may be 
mixed. Whilst increased shipping would develop the financial 
situation of the Arctic, it could also cause further pollution.  
 
                                                          
75 The temperature rise in the Arctic within a century is projected to be up 
to 7 degrees centigrade. Id. at 27. The increase of glacial melt and river runoff 
flows will deposit more freshwater into the ocean. Id. at 37. This may slow the 
water circulation, which usually carries tropical heat to the Arctic. Id. Together 
with a rise in sea level, the disturbances of insects and other non-native species 
may cause new diseases. Id. at 10, 33, 37.The present level of received UV 
radiation per person in the Arctic is 30% higher than previously measured. Id. 
at 11. The northern shrimp collection could decline by up to 70%. Id. at 115. 
Infrastructure damage resulting from the thawing of permafrost in Siberia is 
projected to rise by up to 90% based on a survey of the 1990s. Id. at 117. The 
abundance of sea lions has declined up to 80% over a few decades in the seas 
adjacent to Chukotka, Alaska and the Western Canadian Arctic. Id. at 118. In 
summertime, the maximum northward retreat of ice is projected to increase 
from the present 150-200 kilometers to 500-800 kilometers during this century. 
Id. at 120. 
76  ACIA Scientific Report, supra note 70, at 61-98. 
77 Id. at 77. 
78 Id. at 76-77. 
79 Id. 
80ACIA Scientific Report, supra note 70, at 864-902. 
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B. ACIA Policy Document 
 
The Arctic Council has issued the ACIA Policy Document 
inspired by the ACIA report.
81
 In order to combat climate change 
in the Arctic, the ACIA Policy Document suggests two types of 
actions: mitigation and adaptation.
82
 For the mitigation of 
climate change-related risks and considering the findings of the 
ACIA and other relevant studies for the implementation of the 
recommendations under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and other 
agreements; the policy document has suggested taking decisive 
actions without delay, to address global emissions.
83
 The 
Document urges the limitation of greenhouse gas emissions to 
standard levels, the promotion of appropriate technologies and 
sources of energy, and the adoption of policies and programs for 
the conservation and enhancement of carbon sinks and 
reservoirs, following the principles of sustainable development.
84
 
The mitigation of climate change in a specific region is both 
challenging and uncertain, mainly for reasons of regional 
governance. However, adaptation to climate change could be a 
useful means in situations where climate change is unavoidable 
and special attention is needed to strengthen the adaptive 
capacities of Northern populations.
85
 The Policy Document 
recommends that the Arctic states work closely with residents of 
the Arctic (including indigenous and local communities) in order 
to promote their ability to adapt to and manage the various 
                                                          
81  Artic Council [AC], Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Policy 
Document, Fourth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting (Nov. 24, 2004) 
[hereinafter Policy Document]. The AMAP and the CAFF were invited to 
prepare the ACIA policy report on the basis of the ACIA findings. They formed 
a policy drafting team comprising designated people from member states and 
permanent participants. The team prepared three drafts of the policy report as 
well as those sent to the SAO in an informal manner. They developed four sets 
of recommendations (i) mitigation, (ii) adaptation (iii) research and (iv) 
observation, monitoring, modeling, communication and education including a 
scientific summary. See Artic Council, Draft Minutes, Arctic Council Meeting 
for Arctic Officials, ¶ 6.2, (Oct. 23-24, 2004). 
82 Policy Document, supra note 81. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
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impacts of climate change. Further, the Document has 
encouraged national and international research bodies and 
sponsors to develop and implement programs since increasing 
natural and social science research on the impact of climate 
change and adaptation to it may play a useful role in adapting 
local people to the changed situation.
86
 Also the dissemination of 
the ACIA documents in international forums will improve 
cooperation at both national and local levels if various methods 
and languages are utilized to include more residents of the Arctic 
in the process.
87
  
 
C. Arctic Council Focal Point  
 
The Arctic Council Focal Point (FP)
88
 was established in 
2005 mainly to take care of ACIA follow-up activities derived 
from the recommendations of ACIA Policy Document Report.
89
 
“The focal point will coordinate the ACIA follow-up activities 
within the WGs and prepare proposals for the [AC] in relation to 
ACIA follow-up issues,” as articulated in the Reykjavik 
Declaration and the SAO report to the fourth Ministerial 
                                                          
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88  The “focal point is comprised of the Chairs (or their designated 
representatives) of the Arctic Council Working Groups. The Senior Artic 
Officials are represented in the focal point by the Chairman of the SAOs. The 
Permanent Participants are invited to nominate one representative to the focal 
point to represent them all.” Arctic Council [AC], Minutes, Arctic Council 
Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, at 8-9 (April 6-7, 2005) [hereinafter 
Minutes of Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials].   
89  “The Impact Assessment recommends to Ministers to: (1) Direct 
relevant technical working groups of the Arctic Council to review the scientific 
chapters of the ACIA in the context of their ongoing and future work 
programmes and to report on the progress made at the 2006 Ministerial 
Meeting; (2) Decide to keep under review the need for an updated assessment 
of climate change in the Arctic, drawing inter alia on the IPCC fourth 
assessment report and the results of the International Polar Year 2007-2009; (3) 
Direct SAOs to nominate a focal point and to be responsible for an ACIA 
follow up, including an assessment of gaps in knowledge; and (4) 
Communicate, as appropriate, any Arctic Council ACIA follow-up actions to 
the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC.” Policy Document, supra note 
81. 
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Meeting.
90
  The FP was expected to “cooperate closely with the 
IASC and other relevant actors to ensure that proposals for 
ACIA follow-up by the [AC] [WGs] are coordinated and 
harmonized with activities outside of the AC.”91 
  The FP prepared the Focal Point Report to SAOs in 
2006.
92
 The report recommended the FP as an implementation 
mechanism in order to prioritize work for advance adaptation in 
the circumpolar North, “including regular scientific assessment[] 
or vulnerability and risk.”93  Yet, disagreement arose in whether 
to establish a new unit or to utilize the existing working groups 
and to strengthen them where needed. Primarily   it suggested a 
case study approach in which case studies addressing adaptation 
issues were examined and shared; “to facilitate continuous 
learning, knowledge sharing and capacity building and to gain 
experience with and further develop [methods].
94
 This approach 
aimed to “clearly demonstrate the issues, the decision making 
processes, and the results of adaptation measures.” 95  Another 
view of undertaking adaptation activities was to strengthen the 
basis for priority setting and actions intended in regard to 
adaptation.
96
 It included the seeking of opportunities to promote 
a global, national, and local awareness of the ACIA results and 
to advance education, outreach, and information on adaptation 
issues in the region. It also looked to the follow-through on other 
recommendations for research, observations, monitoring and 
modeling, such as those included in the ACIA science report and 
policy document.
97
 These recommendations were built on the 
basis of the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC (TAR) and the 
ACIA reports, and in looking forward to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC (AR4), that the AC should take early and 
                                                          
90 Minutes of Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, supra note 88, at 9. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93  REPORT OF THE   ARCTIC COUNCIL FOCAL POINT (FP) FOR ACIA 
FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES 25 (2006). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 26.   
97 Id. 
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substantive action on adaptation to climate change in the Arctic 
region.
98
 
Yet, within a short period of time it was realized that the FP 
(as composed in 2005), had insufficient expertise on climate 
issues. Many units of the AC objected to their limited access or 
non-access to FP meetings and in particular, the PPs looked for 
stronger participation.
99
 Under these circumstances, Norway 
proposed two options for replacing the FP: 1. to create a new 
climate WG under the AC, with the main responsibility of 
climate change follow-up and implementation; or 2. establish 
one of the existing WGs as the lead group for climate change and 
involve other WGs as appropriate.
100
 In 2006, the SAOs 
recognized that the future work on ACIA follow-up should be 
undertaken within the existing WGs and thus the FP became 
inactive.
101
 
 
D. Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic  
 
The AC established Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the 
Arctic (SWIPA) in 2008, which is an update and extension to the 
ACIA findings on the consequences of change in the Arctic 
Cryosphere
102
 component of the global climate system. The 
results of the SWIPA assessment were published in the SWIPA 
Scientific Assessment Report, and the related SWIPA Overview 
Report. This “assessment of the impacts of climate change on 
[SWIPA] . . . brings together the latest scientific knowledge 
about the changing state of each component of the Arctic 
                                                          
98 Id. at 25. 
99  Id. at 28. 
100 Id. at 29-30. 
101 Id. at 10. 
102 “Cryosphere is the scientific term for that part of the Earth’s surface 
that is seasonally or perennially frozen. It includes snow, frozen ground, ice on 
rivers and lakes, glaciers, ice caps, ice sheets and sea ice. The cryosphere 
structures the physical environment of the Arctic. It provides services to 
humans such as freshwater supplies and transport routes. The cryosphere is an 
integral part of the climate system, and affects climate regionally and globally.” 
ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME (AMAP), SWIPA 2011 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: SNOW, WATER, ICE AND PERMAFROST IN THE ARCTIC 3 
(2011), AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.AMAP.NO/DOCUMENTS/DOC/SWIPA-2011-
EXECUTIVE-SUMMARY-SNOW-WATER-ICE-AND-PERMAFROST-IN-THE-ARCTIC/744 
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Cryosphere, . . . [and] examines how these changes will impact 
both the Arctic as a whole, as well as people living within the 
Arctic and elsewhere in the world.”103  The SWIPA overview 
report and executive summary released in 2011 includes fifteen 
key findings
104
 along with a set of recommendations: adaptation, 
mitigation, observation, outreach and policy needs.
105
 It has 
included the recommendation that the AC “should conduct an 
integrated assessment of the combined impacts of change in the 
Arctic, focused on how to minimize environmental damage and 
enhance human well-being.” 106   The SWIPA overview report 
suggests informing and educating Arctic residents along with the 
global community “about the changes in the Arctic linked to 
climate change, and how they affect people locally, regionally 
and globally.”107 This responsibility is expected to be undertaken 
by AC members and observers both collectively and 
individually. This report has also recommended increased 
cooperation and coordination efforts at all levels of governments 
and institutions “to respond to the challenges and opportunities 
associated with [climate] change.”108 Finally, a shorter summary 
of SWIPA was published in 2012 for the general public and 
educational audiences, which contains 17 pages and is translated 
into different languages – Climate Change in the Arctic: A Hot 
Topic.
109
 
 
                                                          
103 Id. 
104 ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME (AMAP), supra 
note 1, at V-X . SWIPA 2011 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: SNOW, WATER, ICE AND 
PERMAFROST IN THE ARCTIC, supra note 102, at 4, 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12. 
105ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME (AMAP), supra 
note 1, at ix; SWIPA 2011 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: SNOW, WATER, ICE AND 
PERMAFROST IN THE ARCTIC, supra note 102, at 15. 
106 Id. 
107 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), supra note 
1, at xi. 
108 Id. 
109 See generally Symon, Carolyn, Climate Change in the Arctic: A Hot 
Topic, ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME (AMAP) (2011), 
available at http://www.amap.no/documents/doc/climate-change-in-the-arctic-
a-hot-topic/101.  
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E. Arctic Council Task Force on Short-Lived Climate 
Forcers 
 
The Task Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers (TFSLCF) 
was established in 2009 by the AC in order to assess the impacts 
of short-lived climate forcers (e.g., black carbon, methane, 
tropospheric ozone precursors) on climate change in the Arctic 
region.
110
 The TFSLCF prepared a technical report on mitigation 
options for Black Carbon (BC) in the Arctic in 2011.
111
 It 
includes relevant useful information that may contribute to not 
only determining the sources of BC in the Arctic or limit its 
emission so as to reduce negative consequences in the region, 
but also to contribute to the development of general climate   
science.
112
 For instance,  “BC remains in the atmosphere for days 
to weeks and warms the climate by absorbing both incoming and 
outgoing solar radiation and by darkening snow and ice after 
deposition, thereby reducing the surface albedo, or 
reflectivity.”113 Clearly, it is this albedo effect that is particularly 
pertinent in the Arctic.
114
 The main findings of the TFSLCF 
report include: 
 
1. The largest sources of black carbon emissions in 
Arctic Council nations have been identified;
115
 
2. There is still considerable uncertainty regarding the 
quantification of the exact magnitude of black 
carbon emissions, particularly from sources such as 
agricultural burning, open biomass burning (i.e., 
                                                          
110  Tromsø Declaration, Arctic Council, Apr. 29, 2012 [hereinafter 
Tromsø Declaration]. 
111  See generally TECHNICAL REPORT OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL TASK 
FORCE ON SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE FORCERS, AN ASSESSMENT OF EMISSIONS AND 
MITIGATION OPTIONS FOR BLACK CARBON FOR THE ARCTIC COUNCIL (2011), 
available at http://library.arcticportal.org/1210/1/ACTF_Report_ 
22July2011.pdf. 
112 HASANAT, supra note 21, at 230. 
113 TECHNICAL REPORT OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL TASK FORCE ON SHORT-
LIVED CLIMATE FORCERS, supra note 111, at TS-2. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at TS-3. 
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wildfires and prescribed forest burning), and gas 
flaring;
116
 
3. Overall, the total black carbon emissions from 
Arctic Council nations are projected to decrease in 
the coming decades, primarily due to the effective 
implementation of transportation-related particulate 
matter controls;
117
 
4. To maximize climate benefits, PM [Particulate 
Matter] control programmes must aim to achieve 
maximum black carbon reductions;
118
 
5. Several mitigation measures have been identified to 
further reduce major emission source categories;
119
 
6. Additional measurements, research, and analyses are 
needed to better identify the specific BC mitigation 
measures (both inside and outside of the Arctic 
Council nations) that will lead to the largest Arctic 
climate benefits.
120
  
 
F. Climate Change Related Reports/Projects 
 
The AC initially considered the issue of climate change at 
the secondary level of its mandate while, within two years, the 
climate change issue became well-known with the publication of 
the State of the Arctic Environment Report.
121
  This report 
highlighted climate change as a driver of Arctic change, and 
policy-makers became familiar with the issue. From then on a 
good number of projects have been undertaken by the various 
WGs of the AC relating to climate change, with some others still 
ongoing.
122
 Most of these projects are research-oriented in order 
to achieve a better understanding of climate change in the Arctic 
and its impact on arctic environments. Vulnerability and 
                                                          
116 Id. at TS-5. 
117 Id. at TS-6. 
118 Id. at TS-7. 
119 Id.  
120 Id. at TS-10. 
121  See generally ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME 
(AMAP), supra note 1. 
122  See Projects, AMAP, www.amap.no/projects (last visited Oct. 5, 
2013). 
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Adaptation to Climate Change in the Arctic (VACCA)
123
 could 
be an example which aimed specifically to increase the adaptive 
capacity of Arctic communities. Adaptation Actions for a 
Changing Arctic (AACA) is an ongoing project and aims to 
collect information on climate change adaptation activities 
relevant to the Arctic region over the past ten years.
124
 
Conducting climate change oriented research by the WGs of the 
AC has created experts and strengthened their credibility at a 
global level in producing knowledge related to climate change.
125
 
This has encouraged global institutions to work with those 
experts.
126
 The Climate Change and POPs [Persistent Organic 
Pollutants]: Predicting the Impacts
127
 report can be taken as an 
example - the UNEP/Stockholm Convention Secretariat prepared 
this report jointly with the AMAP Expert Group in 2011.  The 
report suggests that climate change may increase the planet's 
vulnerability to highly toxic chemicals.
128
 It highlights the 
complex relationships between climate change and POPs, and 
human and environmental exposures in a changing climate both 
in global and Arctic contexts.
129
 It also identifies several key 
                                                          
123  “Main objects of the VACCA was to undertake a scoping study 
including collect and disseminate information on the expertise, existing and 
ongoing research and adaptation strategies/measures on adaptation to climate 
change in the Arctic; and to arrange international expert/stakeholder workshop 
in which leading experts, policy makers working group representatives and key 
stakeholders would meet and discuss on vulnerability and adaptation to climate 
change as well as preparing recommendations for potential future work for the 
Arctic Council. The project was completed in December 2008 and the Tromsø 
ministerial noted that vulnerability and adaptation would be strengthened in 
future reports on climate change.” HASANAT, supra note 21, at 232, n.201. 
124 Arctic Council, Adaptation of Actions for a Changing Arctic (AACA), 
(May 15, 2012), available at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en 
/document-archive/category/118-deputy-ministers-meeting-stockholm-15-may-
2012. See also, Arctic Council, Meeting of Deputy Ministers, 15 May 2012 
Final Report, Article 4. 
125 HASANAT, supra note 21, at 232. 
126 Id. 
127  See generally UNEP/AMAP EXPERT GROUP, CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND POPS: PREDICTING THE IMPACTS (2011).  
128 Id. at 7. 
129 Id. at 7-8. 
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areas where knowledge gaps exist and suggests how to address 
them.
130
  
 
G. Involvement in the Global Climate Change Regime  
 
The AC’s involvement with the activities of the UNFCCC 
was limited (until 2009) to re/affirming its support of the 
Convention, organizing side-events, and issuing a couple of 
statements, rather than creating any strong commitment to global 
emission control.
131
  
Once the AC noticed that all member states have joined the 
climate convention,
132
 but they have never discussed the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in any ministerial meeting. In 
2005 the AC members, permanent participants and observers 
issued a joint statement at the first meeting of the Kyoto 
Protocol, which also served as the 11
th
 Conference of the Parties 
to the UNFCCC, to have a climate regime and that the IPCC take 
ACIA results into account in their future decisions.
133
 The AC 
agreed on the active contribution of all Arctic states in reaching 
an satisfactory outcome at the UNFCCC 15
th
 Conference of the 
Parties (COP15) in Copenhagen in December 2009 also 
submitted a summary report of the Arctic Cryosphere: Snow, 
Water, Ice, and Permafrost to the UNFCCC COP 15 meeting in 
Copenhagen and IPCC for use in the IPCC’s future 
assessment.
134
 
Then again in 2011 the AC “[c]onfirm[ed] the commitment 
of all Arctic states” jointly with other states in order “to 
implement the agreement reached in Cancun” by the climate 
talks in Durban and urged all parties for “urgent action” to 
                                                          
130 Id. 
131 HASANAT, supra note 21, at 232. 
132 Arctic Council, Salekhard Declaration, at 2 (Oct. 26, 2006), available 
at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/5- 
declarations?download=39:salekhard-declaration-2006. 
133 News Release, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Arctic Indigenous Peoples 
Unveil Statement on Climate Change at 12-13 (June 12, 2005) in REPORT ON 
ACTIVITIES UNFCCC COP 11 [hereinafter Statement on Climate Change], 
available at http://www.arcticathabaskancouncil.com/aac/files/climate_change/ 
UNFCCCCOP11.pdf. 
134 Tromsø Declaration, supra note 110, at 2. 
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achieve the “long-term goal” of the UNFCCC;135 and “direct[ed] 
SAO[] to review the need for an integrated assessment" of 
diverse Arctic change.
136
 The AC prepared and submitted a 
statement to the last Durban Conference of the UNFCCC which 
includes, inter alia, “[c]ombating climate change is an urgent 
common challenge for the international community and requires 
immediate global action” and “[w]e therefore urge all countries 
to take decisive action, recognizing that deep cuts in global GHG 
emissions are required according to science with a view to 
reducing global GHG emissions so as to hold the increase in 
global average temperature below 2 C above pre-industrial 
levels.”137 
However, the Arctic states could not succeed in creating a 
common Arctic voice in reducing global carbon emission, even 
when a few members played different roles than expected 
throughout its statement. For instance, the withdrawal of Canada 
from the Kyoto Protocol may surprise scholars in the field of 
climate change, as it surprised the UNFCCC Executive Secretary 
Christiana Figueres.
138
 Although Canada cannot deny its legal 
responsibility as party to the UNFCCC, it hampers a joint Arctic 
effort to convince non-Arctic states to properly consider global 
climate change. As Figueres said: “‘[i]ndustrialized countries, 
whose emissions have risen significantly since 1990, as is the 
case for Canada, remain in a weaker position to call on 
developing countries to limit their emissions.’”139 
In addition to the above mention activities, AMAP has 
formed a Climate Expert Group (CEP) whose primary aim is to 
provide expert advice concerning future activities related to 
                                                          
135 Nuuk Declaration, supra note 63, at 4. 
136 Id. 
137 Arctic Council, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian 
Federation, Sweden and the United States of America: Statement to UNFCCC 
COP XVII (Nov. 28 – Dec. 9, 2011), available at http://www.arctic-
council.org/images/attachments/extra_information/arctic_council_statement_to
_the_cop_xvii.pdf. 
138 Canada’s withdrawal from Kyoto Protocol Regrettable – UN Climate 
Official, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story 
.asp?newsid=40714#.Uduiifk3Ayh. 
139 Id. 
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climate change in the Arctic.
140
 This CEG has been contributing 
noteworthy efforts to the development of climate change science 
although it works in an informal manner.
141
 The AC also 
established the “Short-Lived Climate Forcers Contaminants 
project steering group” tasked with “undertak[ing] circumpolar 
demonstration projects to reduce BC and other SLCF 
emissions.”142 
The AC has considered climate issue seriously when it has 
adopted the Vision of the Arctic recently.
143
 Moreover, Canada as 
the present chair of the AC has announced the priority areas of 
the AC that also covers the climate change issue to a limited 
extent (short-lived climate forcers) achieving “[S]ustainable 
[C]ircumpolar [C]ommunities.”144 
  
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE COUNCIL IN ADDRESSING 
CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGES 
 
There are some shortcomings of the AC concerning 
addressing climate change challenges and carrying out its 
general activities.  
 
 A. Nascent Secretariat  
 
                                                          
140 See Hasanat, supra note 16, at 147 n.156. “The Climate Expert Group 
is co-chaired by Dr. John Walsh (University of Alaska) and Øystein Hov 
(Norwegian Meteorological Institute). There are no fixed members in the 
Group. However, the co-chairs may request distinguished climate experts if 
they desire to have a meeting.” Id. 
141 Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Narvik, Nor., Nov. 28-29, 2007, 
Final Report, § 9.1. 
142 Nuuk Declaration, supra note 63, at 3. 
143 Arctic Council, Vision for the Arctic, at 3 (May 15, 2013), available at 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-
main-documents-from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting?download=1749:kiruna-
vision-for-the-arctic. 
144 GOV’T OF CAN., DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH: THE 
ARCTIC COUNCIL PROGRAM DURING CANADA’S CHAIRMANSHIP (2013-15) 
(2013), available at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document- 
archive/category/425-main-documents-from-kiruna-ministerial-
meeting?download=1763:canadian-chairmanship-program-2013-2015-english. 
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As discussed above, the AC did not have any permanent 
secretariat until this year. However, there is a need of a 
permanent secretariat for a soft-law institution like the AC in 
order to “deepen and solidify” the cooperation at international 
level.
145
 A permanent secretariat provides a forum with 
individual personality in operating its activities, keeping the 
forum outside from the exclusive control of any powerful state or 
the chair state.  It may take some time for the newly established 
ASC to be fully operational and to realize how Norway, the host 
country, and other member states cooperate with the secretariat.   
 
B. Weak Funding Mechanism 
 
The AC lacks its own funds to be used for its projects, 
which can be seen as a drawback to fulfilling the main 
objectives.
146
 Any Arctic state or permanent participant may 
propose any projects within the AC so long as those projects 
serve the key interests of the AC, subject to showing a guarantee 
of adequate funding and support from another Arctic state.
147
 
However, states my propose projects not intending to serve the 
main goal of the AC – but simply to get credit for being the lead 
country of an AC project.
148
 The AC manages regular work with 
annual fees from the members; however, there is no regular 
budget for implementing its development projects, mainly 
related to climate change. The AC has very limited control over 
its projects; one of the main reasons for this is the issue of 
funding – any lead country may even withdraw a project at any 
phase. For instance, Norway withdrew a follow-up to the 
VACCA project in 2009.
149
  
 
                                                          
145  Nikolas Stellheim, The Establishment of the Permanent Arctic 
Council Secretariat: Challenges and Opportunities, in THE ARCTIC COUNCIL: 
ITS PLACE IN THE FUTURE OF ARCTIC GOVERNANCE 60, 63 (Thomas S. 
Axworthy, Timo Koivurova & Waliul Hasanat eds., 2012). 
146 Hasanat, supra note 16, at 148. 
147  Rules of Procedure, supra note 19, pt. 26, annex 1. Terms of 
Reference for a Sustainable Development Programme, supra note 26, s.2. 
148 Hasanat, supra note 16, at 148. 
149 Regular Meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark, Sustainable Development 
Working Group (Nov. 10-11, 2009) (observation by author). 
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C. Poor Coordination with WGs 
 
There are no clear boundaries of working areas of the WGs. 
The activities of the WGs generally lack specificity and are 
largely descriptive.
150
 The participants at the SDWG meeting 
once used such wording to criticize the fact that AMAP deals 
with health care issues, while CAFF handles cultural matters.
151
  
 
 
 
D. Problems Concerning National Delegates 
 
Arctic states’ delegates in the various committees or 
meetings within the AC mainly come from their respective 
foreign ministries and participate in the activities of the AC in 
addition to performing their regular tasks.
152
 The member states 
frequently change their SAO and other representatives to the 
AC.
153
 For these reasons they can neither pay satisfactory 
attention to the AC’s work nor become deeply knowledgeable 
about the AC’s climate change related activities, which results in 
the national delegations having few experts (subject to 
exceptions, of course), as opposed to the PPs who use 
consultants with real knowledge about the functioning and 
activities of the AC and other issues related to the North.
154
 A 
member state may even include people who cannot make a 
useful contribution in its delegation or send a big team without 
proper coordination.
155
 
 
E. Lack of Realization of Northern Needs at the 
National Level 
 
It is common for AC member states to disregard issues 
related to climate change in the North when setting up their 
                                                          
150  Id. 
151 Regular Meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark, supra note 149. 
152 Hasanat, supra note 16, at 149. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
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national political priorities.
156
  This may result from the fact that 
inhabitants in the North do not have enough influence in national 
policy-making.
157
 National delegates to the AC may lack 
knowledge on issues related to the North since most of them are 
chosen by the capitals, mainly by the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, which are located far away in the south (except Iceland). 
In fact, the Arctic part of the Arctic states is different from the 
national capitals in many respects. A survey conducted in certain 
southern cities of the Arctic states revealed that few people 
living in the non-Arctic parts of the member states know about 
the AC.
158
 
  
F. Lack of Confidence in the AC 
 
The AC has been unable to create confidence in its 
members, in particular in addressing the consequences of climate 
change in the region. Ilulissat Declaration
159
 could be an 
example: five Arctic Ocean coastal states (Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, Russia, and the USA), who are members of the AC, 
adopted the declaration in 2008 aimed at dealing with the 
increasingly open Arctic Ocean due to climate change.
160
 Their 
initiative can be seen as a major challenge to the AC since a core 
Arctic issue is being dealt with outside the AC. However, the 
coastal states, in the declaration, do not see the necessity of 
creating any new legally binding instruments since existing 
international agreements, mainly the UNCLOS, seem sufficient 
to address the increasing challenges in the marine Arctic.
161
 
                                                          
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158  The interviews conducted by the present author took place in 
Washington, New York, Moscow, Copenhagen, Aarhus, Stockholm, and 
Helsinki. 
159 Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat Declaration at 1-2 (May 28, 2008), 
available at http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration 
.pdf (“We therefore see no need to develop a new comprehensive international 
legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.”). 
160 Hasanat, supra note 16, at 149. 
161 Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat Declaration at 1-2 (May 28, 2008), 
available at http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration 
.pdf (“We therefore see no need to develop a new comprehensive international 
legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.”). 
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G. Lack of Unity 
 
The Arctic states observe different challenges and 
opportunities caused by climate change in terms of their national 
interests which has prevented the member states from creating 
common Arctic voice. Their different role in climate change 
issues is viewed not only within the AC but also in global 
climate regime. 
They failed to reach agreement in order to introducing 
mandatory financial contribution and formalizing the AC.
162
 For 
instance, Canada from the very beginning wanted to have a 
formal international organization; while Finland took the 
initiative of reforming the AC during its chairmanship and 
Norway tried to bring significant changes within the AC’s 
functioning system during its chair period, which did not work 
out due to different opinions among the member states.
163
 
However, the United States seems reluctant to acknowledge the 
AC as a formal international organization.
164
  It is well accepted 
that uniting states associated with the AC may yet bring about a 
functional global climate regime since two members (Russia and 
the U.S.) and two observers (China and India) are able to play a 
key role in global climate politics.
165
  
 
H. Other Deficiencies  
 
 There are many scholars who see the soft-law nature of the 
AC as a major deficiency since it cannot create any legally 
                                                          
162VanderZwaag, supra note 15, at  267. Samantha Smith, Ministerial 
with Only Three Ministers, 4 WWF ARCTIC BULL. 4, [PINCITE] (2000) (“For a 
variety of reasons, the US has worked to ensure that the Arctic Council has a 
limited mandate, and thus has limited significance.”). 
163  Interview with Stein Paul Rosenberg, Senior Advisor, Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Section for the High North, Resources, and Russia, 
in Copenhagen, Den. (Nov. 11, 2009). 
164 Hasanat, supra note 16, at 150. 
165  See Olav Schram Stokke, Protecting the Arctic Environment: The 
Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes, 1 Y.B. POLAR L. 349, 349-50 
(2009). 
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binding obligations to its members.
166
 However, the present 
author views the soft-law nature as an advantage mainly when 
dealing with the consequences caused from climate change in the 
North, also involving local residents in AC’s policy making [see 
below in Part V (B)].  
There are however, still many problems that need to be 
addressed in the AC if it can serve as a platform for effective 
action against climate change challenges.
167
 The AC also lacks a 
separate unit dealing with the external relations with other states 
and relevant international platforms, sufficient practical activities 
which utilize the results of research, robust evaluations of 
prepared documents (guidelines and reports) in terms of their 
influence and value and a strong social media center.
168
  
 
                                                          
166 For instance, Oran R. Young, If an Arctic Ocean Treaty is Not the 
Solution, What is the Alternative?, 47 POLAR REC. 327, 331 (2011). PHILIPPE 
SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 597 (3rd ed. 
2012). 
167 See Alison Ronson, Political Climate Change: The Evolving Role of 
the Arctic Council, 33 NORTHERN. REV. 95, 100-01 (2011); see also Oran R. 
Young, Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North, 
45:232  POLAR RECORD 73, 73, 79 (2009). 
168 “A strong media centre seems important for the AC in order to supply 
relevant news to the governments and local inhabitants mainly focusing on 
member states contributions and other sensitive events so as to avoid 
unexpected tension caused from wrongly broadcasting in other media. An 
example of such broadcasting was when in August 2007, two Russian mini-
submarines planted a Russian flag at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean at the 
North Pole, it was in fact an adventure trip partly financed by a Scandinavian 
businessman. The flag of the Adventurer’s Club of New York was also on 
board and an Australian and an American citizen, who were the masterminds of 
the trip, were included in the mission. However, the media presented the event 
in a different way, and that Russia had occupied the North Pole as part of its 
sovereign territory although it was no way an official act of the Russian 
Government.” HASANAT, supra note 21, at 238 n.217. See also Martin Breum, 
When the Arctic Council Speaks: How to Move the Council’s Communication 
into the Future, in THE ARCTIC COUNCIL: ITS PLACE IN THE FUTURE OF ARCTIC 
GOVERNANCE 114, 120 n.1 (Axworthy, Koivurova & Hasanat, supra note 145 
). However, see also Pavel Baev, Russia’s Race for the Arctic and the New 
Geopolitics in the North Pole, OCCASIONAL PAPER 3-4 (October 2007); Klaus 
Dodds, Flag Planting and Finger Pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and 
the Political Geographies of the Outer Continental Shelf, 29 POLITICAL 
GEOGRAPHY  63, (2010). 
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V. HOW TO STRENGTHEN THE AC TO COMBAT CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
 
Enhancing the strength of the AC in general may result in 
better addressing the consequences of climate change in the 
North. Several proposals made by different scholars for 
reforming the AC already exist. Looking at these proposals may 
provide meaningful assistance in preparing recommendations 
aiming to tackle the climate change challenges in the North.    
 
A. Existing Reformation Proposals 
 
Donat Pharand proposed to develop an international 
organization by drafting a formal treaty under the auspices of the 
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee during the formation of 
the AEPS.
169
 However, his proposal has not been accepted and 
has been criticized by scholars because they do not see the 
possibility of it being a formal international organization within 
a short period of time.
170
 Linda Nowlan has also suggested the 
formalization of the AC through an international treaty, which 
would derive inspiration from the Madrid Protocol to the 
Antarctic Treaty and contain principles, substantive legal 
obligations and innovative features relevant to the Arctic.
171
  
However, at some point she has argued for allowing a certain 
period of time to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing soft-
law arrangement and determine whether it needs to be 
supplemented by a treaty.
172
  
David Leary does not support considering the Antarctic 
Treaty System (ATS) as a model for the AC since the Arctic 
includes areas that are mainly under the national jurisdiction of 
                                                          
169 See generally Donat Pharand, Draft Arctic Treaty: An Arctic Region 
Council, in THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT AND CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS (1991), available at http://www.carc.org/pubs/v19no2/5.htm 
(describing the formation of the Arctic Regional Council). 
170   See generally VanderZwaag, et al., supra note 15, at 156, 166-67 
(describing limitations on the power and regulatory regime of the AEPS and the 
Arctic).  
171 Linda  Nowlan, Arctic Legal Regime for Environmental Protection, 44 
IUCN ENVTL  POL’Y & L. 1, 41, 60-66 (2001). 
172 Id. at 59. 
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the Arctic states and there are territorial disputes concerning 
areas that lie beyond national jurisdiction.
173
 While Philippe 
Sands has argued for a formal organization for the AC, similar to 
that which exists for Antarctica, in the near future: 
 
The adoption of the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy and the establishment of the Arctic Council 
[provide] a useful opportunity to develop new legal 
arrangements and institutions to govern an ecosystem 
which transcends national boundaries and requires 
international co-operation for its adequate protection 
to be assured. The soft law approach currently 
envisaged provides a first step; ultimately, it will be 
necessary to establish appropriate institutional 
arrangements and substantive rules, perhaps similar 
to those applied in the Antarctic, to ensure that 
agreed obligations are respected and enforced.
174
  
 
The European Parliament has proposed that an Antarctic 
treaty modeled agreement should be negotiated to govern the 
Arctic (even if they have recently changed their course and no 
longer advocate for an Arctic treaty).
175
 The indication of the 
Parliament’s proposal was to copy the governance framework 
from the other Pole, the Antarctic Treaty’s Environment 
Protocol, and adjust it to Arctic circumstances.
176
 While, some 
scholars also suggested for an overarching treaty.
177
  
Timo Koivurova has suggested a framework treaty managed 
by the Arctic states as a faster way to proceed since the 
consequences of climate change in the Arctic opening up the 
                                                          
173  David Leary, Bi-polar Disorder? Is Bioprospecting an Emerging 
Issue for the Arctic as well as for Antarctica?, 17 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & 
INT’L ENVTL. L. 41, 42, 49, 54-55 (2008). 
174  PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 597 (3d ed. 2012). 
175See generally A Sustainable EU Policy for the High North, PARL. EUR. 
DOC. (TA 0024) (2011), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ 
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-20110024+0+DOC+XML+ 
V0//EN (showing that the EU does not propose an Arctic Treaty modeled after 
the Antarctic Treaty). 
176 HASANAT, supra note 21, at 235-36. 
177 Timo Koivurova, Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty - Evaluation and a 
New Proposal, 17 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY  & INT’L ENVTL. L. 14, 16 (2008). 
228 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22:1  
region to various economic activities will create environmental 
problems for the region.
178
 His detailed proposal with Erik 
Molenaar was published as a report of the WWF International 
Arctic Program, which suggests that the Antarctic Treaty does 
not provide a viable basis for a legally binding Arctic instrument 
but does suggest elements for an overarching Arctic treaty.
179
 
Their suggested model derives from the regional seas 
agreements; their argument being that the law of the sea and 
UNCLOS encourages states to implement their framework type 
obligations on a regional basis.
180
 However, this would have the 
effect of shifting the governance to only marine areas, in contrast 
to the AC approach which includes both the land and marine 
areas of the region.
181
  
The SAOs made a concrete proposal to reform the AC 
which included inter alia better coordination among the WGs, 
communication with other regional bodies, increased funding, 
provide financial support to permanent participants, and the 
expansion of the role of observers.
182
 Pekka Haavisto’s report 
was used as the background paper for the report.
183
 Later on, the 
Arctic Athabaskan Council, a permanent participant in the AC, 
suggested reforms in the light of selected weak points,
184
 which 
are quite similar to suggestions made during the Finnish Chair 
period 2001-2002.
185
 
                                                          
178 Id. at 22-23, 25-26. 
179 Id. 
180 Id.  at 3, 4, 14. 
181 Olav Schram Stokke, A Legal Regime for the Arctic? Interplay with 
the Law of the Sea Convention, 31 MARINE POL’Y 402, 407-08 (2007). 
182 Arctic Council, SAOs Report to Ministers on the Review of The Arctic 
Council Structures, at 2, 4, 9, SAO2002/A/8.0 (May 15, 2002). 
183  Arctic Council, Review of the Arctic Council Structures, at 2, 
SAO/2001/B/10 (Oct. 18, 2001). Finland commissioned Mr. Pekka Haavisto to 
prepare a report for the SAOs concerning the structure of work in the AC to be 
discussed at the SAO meeting on 12-13 June 2001. The final report was 
delivered to the AC secretariat on 29 June 2001 after the SAOs had discussed 
the draft report. Id. 
184  ARCTIC ATHABASKAN COUNCIL, IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL: A DISCUSSION PAPER 6-8 (2007). 
185 Id. at 8. 
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The World Wildlife Fund (WWF), an international NGO 
established in 1961,
186
 has proposed forming a commission 
under the present AC in order to conclude a formal treaty 
protecting the nature in the Arctic.
187
 As Neil Hamilton, who was 
then the Director of the WWF Arctic Program, said:  
 
We need a new approach, which includes thinking 
about a solid Arctic Treaty and a multilateral 
governance body. . . . This is the only way to ensure 
the implementation of sustainable development 
regimes and help the Arctic adapt to the severe 
impact of climate change and ultimately stabilise the 
world’s climate.
188
 
 
Olav Schram Stokke has argued for a flexible approach to 
norm-building through interaction of the AC with other existing 
institutions.
189
 However, his proposal is not new because the AC 
has already involved a number of existing institutions and 
produced scientific data.
190
 He and Geir Hønneland have noticed 
“three great powers” in terms of Arctic actors: Russia, the 
European Union (EU), and the U.S. Any initiative concerning 
the AC needs their support and active contribution to succeed.
191
  
 Julia Jabour and Melissa Weber have proposed a “flexible 
governance structure” for the AC to “advance national interests 
                                                          
186  See About Us, WWF, http://worldwildlife.org/about/history (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2013).  
187  See New Rules Needed for the Arctic, WWF (Aug. 17, 2007) 
http://www.wwf.org.uk/what_we_do/press_centre/?134/New_rules_needed_for
_the_Arctic__WWF. 
188 Id. 
189 OLAV S. STOKKE, THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND THE IDEA OF 
A BINDING REGIME FOR THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT 12, available at 
http://www.arcticparl.org/_res/site/File/images/Underlagsrapport%20eng-
rysk3.pdf. 
190  For instance, the AC affirms support to many legal regime (e.g., 
international convention and treaty) and developed its relationship with a 
number of organizations by accrediting as observer. See Observers, ARCTIC 
COUNCIL, (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-
us/arctic-council/observers. 
191  GEIR HØNNELAND &  OLAV S. STOKKE, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
AND ARCTIC GOVERNANCE: REGIME, EFFECTIVENESS AND NORTHERN REGION 
BUILDING intro. at 6-8 (Olav S. Stokke & Geir Hønnelan eds. 2007). 
230 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22:1  
in a cooperative manner” that takes into account the regional 
interdependence of the Arctic states and their own economic and 
technological advancements.
192
 Meanwhile, Hans Corell has 
proposed the implementation of existing international treaties 
rather than building a new regime, although he has advocated 
engaging more entities within the AC such as the general public, 
politicians, businesses, and governments.
193
 The AC has 
accredited a good number of states as observers this year and 
initiated for establishing a Circumpolar Business Forum 
(CBF).
194
 
 Rothwell has proposed that the Arctic could be seen as part 
of the common heritage of mankind (CHM).
195
 Even though this 
is an inspiring idea, it is still important that it conforms to law of 
the sea.
196
 Only the deep seabed is currently seen as CHM, and 
after the Arctic states have drawn the outermost limits of their 
continental selves, then there is not much seabed left.
197
   
The present author suggested establishing a well-structured 
permanent secretariat for the AC in 2010 rather than forming a 
formal international organization.
198
 An innovative idea that may 
surprise many scholars is how does such a secretariat fit into a 
soft-law body. However, the suggestion was forwarded in the 
context of new practical challenges faced by the region, which 
cannot be managed with the governance established under old 
structure of international law – innovative ideas are needed to 
overcome those challenges. The main issue is to enhance trust 
among the members and their confidence in the AC. The ACS 
could be the permanent venue where the members and other 
states may exchange their views with open minds and may form 
different types of instruments that fit suitably from issue to issue, 
                                                          
192 Julia Jabour & Melissa Weber, Is it Time to Cut the Gordian Knot of 
Polar Sovereignty?, 17 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 27, 40 
(2008). 
193  Hans Corell, Reflections on the Possibilities and Limitations of a 
Binding Legal Regime, 37 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 321, 321-24 (2007). 
194 Kiruna Declaration, supra note 13, at 2, 5. 
195  See DONALD R. ROTHWELL, THE POLAR REGIONS AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 229–31 (1996). 
196 Hasanat, supra note 16, at 155. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 157. 
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including formal international agreements with legally binding 
obligations. 
 
B. Evaluation of the Reformation Proposals 
 
Many of the above mentioned proposals urge for a treaty 
based international organization for the AC. However, it would 
be reasonable to evaluate whether special features of the climate 
change issue and Northern inhabitants match appropriately to 
create any classical international organization with legally 
binding obligations under international law, as explained 
below.
199
 
 
Climate Change Issue 
 
Climate change itself is a complex issue primarily when 
someone tries to understand Arctic climate science
200
 and 
possible ways to combat global climate change.
201
 Principles and 
recommended policy actions regarding climate change are vague 
to some extent and seem more ambitious compared to their 
practical implementation – they focus on what should be done 
rather than what the member states intent to be done – the result 
of any activity combating climate change cannot be observable 
within a short period of time; and CO2 emission conducted 
elsewhere impacts the climate change of whole globe 
irrespective of emitting states.
202
 The emission cutting of 
                                                          
199 See Hasanat, supra note 21, at 201-08. 
200   See generally David N. THOMAS ET AL., THE BIOLOGY OF POLAR 
REGIONS (2008); GUDMUND HERNES, HOT TOPIC - COLD COMFORT: CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND ATTITUDE CHANGE (2012) (describing the complexity of climate 
change in the Arctic). 
201  See CHRISTIAN BJØRNÆS & PÅL PRESTRUD, THE STATE OF THE 
POLES: CLIMATE LESSONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL POLAR YEAR (2012) 
(describing methods of combating climate change). 
202 For instance, increased amount of total CO2 in the atmosphere leads to 
global warming and causes global climate change. For detailed treatment, see 
Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide 
emissions, 106:6 PROC. OF THE NATI’L ACADEMY OF SCI. OF THE U.S, 1704-09 
(2008); Michael R. Raupach et al., Global and regional drivers of accelerating 
CO2 emissions, 104:24 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 
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greenhouse gases negatively impacts economic development and 
human living standards in a state – it is tough to sacrifice present 
advantages of modern science to protect the future environment. 
States outside of the region, therefore, are less likely to sacrifice 
their national interests for the sake of the northern environment. 
Imposing binding obligations against uncertain outcome may 
result to lessen the number of members, since international law 
has recognized the “sovereign equality and independence of all 
states and non-interference in the domestic affairs of [s]tates,”203 
freedom to join an international treaty, make reservations
204
 or 
withdraw from a treaty.
205
 
Changes in the North are rapidly occurring due to climate 
change and immediate action is required to address some of 
those changes. The adoption of a formal international treaty may 
be a lengthy process, but addressing climate change in the region 
may not provide a favorable context for the creation of treaty 
regime.
206
  
 
Northern Inhabitants 
 
The Northern inhabitants also include numbers of 
indigenous communities who have resided in the region for long 
periods of time from generation to generation. As a result, the 
indigenous peoples of the region have developed distinct 
livelihoods and cultures. It is understandable that national 
decision-making takes place in the national capital cities, which 
are located far south of the region, and also that there is a clear 
difference in the lifestyles enjoyed by Arctic and non-Arctic 
residents. Thus, Northern residents may have closer ties to 
similar groups of peoples living in different parts of the 
                                                                                                                   
10288, 10288–93 (2007); JOHN HOUGHTON, GLOBAL WARMING: THE COMPLETE 
BRIEFING, 34-49 (4th ed. 2009). 
203 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties intro. para. 6, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 332.  
204 Id. arts. 19-23, 1166 U.N.T.S. at 336-38. 
205 Id. arts. 54-56, 1166 U.N.T.S. at 344-45. 
206  See Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade 
Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603, 
604-05 (2000); Md Waliul Hasanat, Definitional Constraints Regarding Soft 
Law, 3 AALCO Q. BULL. 8, 31-32 (2007). 
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Circumpolar North beyond traditional state boundaries. 
However, formal international organizations operating under 
classical international law do not allow for the parallel 
participation of these groups with states, despite the fact that 
decisions made for the wellbeing of the region require the 
participation of local residents. As a result, the Northern 
indigenous peoples have gained a substantial role in the AC as 
PP status, which is important in the decision-making processes 
concerning regional challenges. A forum of sub-national 
governments from the Circumpolar North (Arctic Regional 
Council) within the AC or maintaining closer contact may be 
supportive to the local peoples to bring Northern concerns to the 
national level.
207
  
Forming an Arctic treaty may offer the opportunity for 
much more ambitious governance in the North than could be 
achieved within the AC. A downside of a formal treaty is it may 
pose new challenges to the indigenous peoples retaining their 
special position (PP status) gained through the AC.
208
 The 
realities in the region do not support this as a desirable way to 
conduct matters, since the consequences of both hard law (treaty 
based) and soft law (non-treaty based) in international law 
mainly depend on how types of law interact with changing 
conditions in specific regions.
209
 Further, there are multiple 
levels of international, regional, national and sub-national 
governance layers in the Arctic, which do not seem amenable to 
creating an overarching treaty structure.
210
 Moreover, much of 
the Arctic Ocean and waters are under the jurisdiction of the 
Arctic states, making it more difficult to introduce overarching 
                                                          
207 There is a Barents Regional Council under the Barents cooperation 
which has contributed to satisfactory result during last 20 years. Md. Waliul 
Hasanat, A Unique Arrangement of Soft-Law Cooperation in the Barents 
Region, in POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE BARENTS REGION 65, 70-72 
(Monica Tennberg ed., 2012). 
208 Koivurova, supra note 177, at 25; Kiruna Declaration, supra note 13, 
at 6. The AC supports the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS) along with 
granting them permanent participant status. Koivurova, supra note 177, at 25. 
209 See Jon B. Skjærseth, Exploring the Consequences of Soft Law and 
Hard Law: Implementing International Nutrient Commitments in Norwegian 
Agriculture, 10:1 INT’L ENV’L AGRE. POL. L. & ECO. 1-14 (2010). 
210 HASANAT, supra note 21, at 237. 
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international treaties to the region. The Arctic possesses 
permanent human residents and territories under national 
jurisdiction of the Arctic states which are absent in the 
Antarctica; thus, considering the ATS model does not seem 
viable for the AC. 
Moreover, the currently fragmented governance of the 
region could be more consistently governed by a set of regional 
institutions that could coordinate how various treaties (applicable 
in the region) could be synergistically implemented.
211
  Yet, a 
political will does not seem to exist to create such a treaty – none 
of the current Arctic states seem to be willing to engage in 
negotiating an Arctic treaty, as testified by their newly revised 
Arctic national policy documents.
212
 While states voluntarily 
expressed cooperation and support with other states and local 
people, this seems to be more effective mainly in the field of 
environmental protection.
213
 
 
C. Ongoing Development 
 
In fact, the AC is on the way to massive transition. 
However, this part limits to only the developments of the AC 
concerning the above-discussed shortcomings [Part- IV].   
The AC has developed Project Support Instrument (PSI)
 
as 
a funding mechanism jointly with Nordic Environment Finance 
Corporation to finance some of its projects, which seems 
successful since there has been a trend to invest a lot of money 
from different states. For instance, the U.S. invested up to 5 
Million USD
214
 in 2012 and Russia up to 10 Million Euro
215
 in 
                                                          
211  See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTIONS  (1992). 
212  See HARRY BORLASE, CONSISTENCIES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE 
NATIONAL STRATEGIES OF THE ARCTIC LITTORAL STATES (2010), available at 
http://skemman.is/stream/get/1946/5645/16724/1/Harry_Final.pdf; see also 
Peter H. Huang, International Environmental Law and Emotional Rational 
Choice, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (2002). 
213 See generally LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW & FOREIGN 
POLICY 47 (1979); ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: 
CIRCUMSTANCE & CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 45 (1990). 
214 U.S. Allocates 5 Million to the Environment in the Arctic, ARCTIC 
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2011 in order to implement AC’s priority projects. The AC had 
little control over its project for a long time;
216
 however, it has 
been able to exercise control to some extent when the PSI is 
functioning. 
The five Arctic Ocean coastal states, who adopted the 
Ilulissat Declaration, changed their view – at the moment it 
seems that much of the momentum behind the declaration is 
overshadowed because of developments in the AC, and at the 
second meeting in Chelsea, Canada was heavily criticized by the 
then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who argued that the 
AC is the best place for dealing with Arctic issues.
217
 
The AC has approved the Terms of Reference of the ACS, 
its Staff Rules, Financial Rules, Roles and Responsibilities of the 
Director; has also approved the budget for the secretariat for the 
year 2013, and instructed SAOs to approve budget for the next 
term (years 2014-2015).
218
 The secretariat gained legal 
personality including the capacity to contract, to acquire and 
dispose of movable and immovable property, and to institute and 
be a party to legal proceedings when it recently concluded an 
agreement with Norway.
219
 The agreement allows immunity to 
the secretariat and its property from legal process,
220
 grants 
inviolability of its premises,
221
 and other privileges and facilities 
which are generally enjoyed by a classical foreign diplomatic 
mission. 
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Canada, one lead country for AACA project, expected to 
complete this climate change project as one of their main 
priorities.
222
 The SAO submitted Recommendations to Reduce 
Black Carbon and Methane Emissions to Slow Arctic Climate 
Change, a report prepared by the SLCFTF, to the last Ministerial 
Meeting (in Kiruna 2013), and a technical report is at preparing 
stage at the moment.
223
 The report suggests that more than 30% 
of total methane (CH4) emissions are from the AC member 
states, emphasized for new measures to limit the emission, and 
encouraged Arctic states to cooperate with other states to reduce 
total emission.
224
 AMAP plans to complete a scientific 
assessment on BC, tropospheric ozone and methane by 2015.
225
 
The Ministers of Environment from the Arctic states have 
proposed to negotiate an international instrument on BC.
226
 
The Kiruna ministerial meeting has expressed promoting 
dynamism and sustainable economies in the region based on best 
practices under its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and 
decided to establish a Task Force to facilitate the creation of a 
Circumpolar Business Forum (CBF), which is a great initiative 
to enhance interaction and trust among peoples in the North.
227
 
The AC has “acknowledged the decision” of “relocat[ing] the 
Indigenous Peoples Secretariat” by the PPs “to Tromsø, 
Norway”228 (from Copenhagen, Denmark) – there is no doubt 
that it would encourage the PPs to become closely involved in 
the AC activity. 
Recently the AC has endorsed the Arctic Council Observer 
Manual for Subsidiary Bodies aiming to strengthen the work of 
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the different subsidiary bodies of the AC; and established TFlI
229
 
in 2011 to implement its decisions to strengthen the AC.
230
  The 
Kiruna Ministerial Meeting “has instruct[ed]” the SAOs “to 
review and adjust the mandates and work plans” of the WGs 
“including following up their activity.”231 Then the priorities of 
AC during Canadian chair include strengthening the AC by 
focusing on implementation and how to minimize duplication of 
activities, which would support the WGs to clarify their 
boundaries; and more closely involving PPs in the AC activity, 
232
may ensure to bring regional issues within AC activity.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 A number of existing proposals recommend for a formal 
international organization for the AC although the member states 
lack consensus of opinion in order to proffer support for binding 
instruments. While, compliance of any decision (derived from 
either hard or soft-law) mainly depends on the intentions of the 
member states
233
 – it does not always depend on the nature of the 
instrument
234
 - states follow international agreements because of 
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their own interests or to maintain their reputation in international 
society.
235
 
One needs to bear in mind that the AC can handle the 
climate change issue in a better way, if it becomes stronger in 
general and develops expertise in climate change science mainly 
relevant to the North. The reality is that the special situations in 
the region facilitate a soft-law form of cooperation other than 
formal international organization.
236
 It is also of importance to 
emphasize the unique nature of this emerging practice of a soft-
law body producing proactive and legally binding agreements – 
conclusion of the Search and Rescue (SAR)
237
 agreement and Oil 
Spill Agreement
238
 could be used as two examples.  
A promising next step is the most recent development in the 
AC, which can be seen as being unique in international 
relations.
239
 These developments within the AC have made it the 
main platform for assessing the pace and scale of climate change 
in the North, thereby influencing global science processes such 
as the IPCC assessments.
240
 Also indirectly influences decision-
makers to perceive how to forward with climate change 
proceedings. Since decision-makers at various levels have to rely 
on established climate science to make climate change mitigation 
decisions, it can be argued that the AC does have a role to play 
in the overall efforts to mitigate climate change.  
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Yet, the climate science work in the AC does not include 
only to mitigate climate change but also to adapt to the 
consequences of climate change.
241
 The AC has managed to 
involve a satisfactory number of states outside of the Arctic, 
along with international organizations, for this purpose by 
developing awareness among the local peoples to enable them to 
adapt to the changes, and producing climate change science.
242
 It 
simultaneously feeds information to various levels of Arctic 
governance. In respect of this, the members need to take into 
account how their activities are in-line with cutting-edge 
knowledge of how climate change is proceeding in the region, 
and take necessary measures to adapt to its consequences.    
Even though climate change is rapidly transforming the 
region, it does seem (at the time of writing in July 2013) that the 
Arctic Council is moving in the right direction. Yet, this is not to 
say that there is no need for reform in the Arctic Council. The 
author submits the following recommendations for reform:  
 
 There would clearly be the need to create a form of 
Arctic Regional Council (ARC), to include Arctic sub-
national governments (e.g., county and provincial 
governments) in the work of the AC.243 The proposed 
ARC could play an advocacy role to develop closer 
contacts of national governments with residents of the 
Circumpolar North.  
 Working groups, engaged in producing climate change 
science, should be coordinated more effectively, and 
their working boundaries should be clarified.
244
 
Alternatively, a fresh working group could be created for 
taking care only climate change issues namely Climate 
Change Working Group. 
 The Arctic states should ensure that extra burdens are 
not imposed on national delegates, so that they can 
spend enough time on the AC’s activities; national 
governments should develop closer contacts with 
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residents of the Arctic and ensure their proper 
representation in the national delegations; The SAOs 
should not be changed too frequently; if an SAO retires 
from governmental service, the position should be filled 
by someone who has experience participating in the 
delegation. 
 A strong and independent ACS may play a very 
important role in combating climate change in the 
region, which the AC has established recently.
245
 Arctic 
states may take the opportunity to exchange their 
opinions in a more comfortable setting at the premises of 
the ACS, which might lead to the conclusion of several 
international instruments or arrangements regarding 
different issues. Establishment of confidence and faith 
among the members is largely a political issue; more 
interaction may be a means for gaining that confidence 
and faith. In addition to the ongoing development, the 
ACS could be surrounded by various units: one could 
assess the utilization of research findings conducted 
under the auspices of the AC, another could coordinate 
international external relations, and another could 
evaluate prepared documents (guidelines and reports) in 
terms of influence and value. 
 Many AC activities are mainly based on climate change 
during the last few years. The overall strengthening of 
the AC, along with creating common Arctic voice against 
climate change in the Arctic and at the UNFCCC would 
better perform in the field of climate change – a good 
number of initiatives achieving the goal are already 
under the way of implementation.  
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